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JUVENILES’ DEVELOPING CAPACITY AND WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO 
CONSENT TO SEARCHES 
Rosanna Amato 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Age is not just a number. Juveniles are not adults, and in fact, in many circumstances 
juveniles have been recognized by law to be different than adults. This is because they lack the 
maturity, the life experiences, and the capacity to make important life decisions.1 Age has also 
been considered in laws concerning marriages, sex, contract, abortions, interrogations, 
sentencing, and so forth.2 Age should also be a consideration when determining the mental 
capacity of a juvenile to consent to searches. Whether juveniles are allowed to give consent to 
searches is an unresolved issue.3 Courts are inconsistent in how they apply the consideration of 
age and consent.4 The Supreme Court has held in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that to determine 
whether consent was voluntarily given, courts must look at the totality of the circumstances 
including the age of the person accused.5 Schneckloth also stated that intelligence, maturity, and 
knowledge of the right to refuse can also be considered even though not dispositive.6  Some 
                                                                 
1 Jennifer Ann Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law, and in 
the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2006).   
2 Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sunquist, 175 F.3d 456(6th Cir. 1999) (on abortions); 
Parkwood OB/GYN v/ Hess, 70 Misc. 2d 32 (Oh.1995) (on contracts).  
3 Megan Annitto, Abstract, Consent Searches of Minors, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 
11 (2014).  
4 In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497 (D.C.App. 1992) (considering age); State ex rel. R.A., 231 P.3d 808 
(Ut. App. 2010) (not considering age). 
5 Sckneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).  
6 Id.at 220. 
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lower courts have considered age as a factor while others have ignored the issue of age entirely.7 
There needs to be a consistent way to handle this.  
Other scholars have suggested that reasonable juvenile standard should be implemented 
when the court addresses juvenile consent under the Fourth Amendment.8  The reasonable 
juvenile standard was discussed by a court as a modification of the reasonable person standard.9 
That Illinois court modified a reasonable person standard and considered “whether a reasonable 
juvenile would have thought his freedom of movement was restricted.10 Although that may be a 
step in the right direction, a reasonable juvenile standard is vague and subject to many different 
interpretations.11 Since it is so vague, this standard will be difficult to apply on a uniform basis.12  
Juveniles need more protections than adults do. This is shown by case law prohibiting 
minors from receiving the death penalty and life without parole.13 Also, this is demonstrated by 
laws not allowing minors to consent to various things such a sex or marriage or even having the 
ability to vote.14 Since minors aren’t capable of these things because that their brains are still 
developing, they should not be able to consent to searches at all.15 Minors need that protection 
and there is no better time for a bright line rule then now.  
 
                                                                 
7 In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497 (D.C.App. 1992) (considering age); State ex rel. R.A., 231 P.3d 808 
(Ut. App. 2010) (not considering age). 
8 Annitto, supra note 3, at 39. 
9 People v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047,1061 (Ill. 2008). 
10 Id.  
11 Annitto, supra note 3, at 39. 
12 Id.  
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)  
14 Drobac, supra note 1, at 6. 
15 Id. at 2.  
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II. EXISTING LAW ON CONSENT SEARCHES  
 The fourth amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches generally to all 
persons whether juveniles or not. The amendment states: “the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”16 An established exception to this amendment is consent.17 Consent has to be free of 
coercion.18 It also has to be understood that giving consent means losing rights that offer 
protection.19 Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is also a consideration when asking if the 
consent was voluntary.20 As will later be discussed, this is a problem especially for juveniles 
because their will is more likely to be overborne by police officers than their adult counterparts.21  
 A very important case establishing when consent is voluntary is Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte.22 In Schneckloth, a police officer was on nightly routine when around 2:40 in the 
morning he stopped a vehicle because one of the headlights and a license plate light were burned 
out. The officer asked to search the vehicle after he asked all occupants of the vehicle for their 
identification and only the driver was able to do so. The driver consented to the search by saying, 
“sure, go ahead.” The police officer searched the entire vehicle with the cooperation of the 
driver. Then, underneath the back seat, the police officer found three crumpled up stolen 
                                                                 
16 U.S. Const. amend. IV  
17 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973). 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 241.  
21 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law, 
and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1 (2006).   
22 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 (1973).  
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checks.23 The Court had to determine whether consent was voluntarily given. The Court 
established that consent has to be made of free choice without duress or coercion.24  
An example of involuntary action is the case Brown v. Mississippi, where brutality and 
violence was used in obtaining a confession.25 The Court determined that cases where there is 
physically harm inflicted, the information obtained cannot be said to be voluntary.26 Now that 
brutality isn’t as common, the Court needed to determine how to analyze and determine whether 
consent in a certain situation is voluntary. The Court held that consent is voluntary when it is 
given without duress or coercion.27 To determine that consent was given without duress or 
coercion, the Court uses a case by case analysis analyzing all the different circumstances in an 
individual case.28 The Court also notes that there are factors that could be considered in the 
analysis; the two most relevant in this paper are age and knowledge of the right to refuse.29 The 
problem with this is that the Court does not require age or the knowledge of the right to refuse to 
be considered.30 In fact, the Court says that it is just a factor that may be considered.31 This is the 
reason why we do not have a uniform rule in how to treat age when determining if consent was 
voluntary. Courts are not consistent or clear about this issue but they need to be. Age cannot be 
ignored. Minors need protection from the consequences of consenting to a search. Minors are 
given protections in many different areas because of the recognition that they are naïve, that they 
                                                                 
23 Id. at 220.  
24 Id.  
25 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  
26 Id.  
27 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220.  
28 Id. at 233.  
29 Id. at 226.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
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don’t fully understand what they are getting themselves into, and that they cannot fully 
understand the consequences of their actions.32 
 Courts have generally taken two very different approaches when determining whether a 
minor’s consent was voluntary.33 Some courts believe age is critical factor, while other courts do 
not consider age at all.34 Courts that do believe age should be considered, embrace the scientific 
research and understand that minors have a “less than well-developed capacity” to understand 
the consequences of consenting to a search.35 Courts that ignore age believe that juveniles have 
roughly the same capacity to understanding the consequences of consenting to a search as adults 
do and require no difference in treatment.36  
 The District of Columbia is one of the jurisdictions that consider age into its analysis of 
whether or not a juvenile’s consent was voluntary.37 In In re J.M., police were on assignment at a 
Greyhound bus station to search buses coming from New York City.38 A bus stopped at the 
station for a ten minute rest stop. The police announced their presence and proceeded to question 
passengers to find out if drugs were being transported. The detective then approached the 
juvenile and asked to search his bag which the juvenile consented to. The officers found nothing 
in the bag. The officer then asked to pat him down. The juvenile did not respond affirmatively, 
he just raised his hands up while still seated. The officer patted the fourteen year old boy down 
                                                                 
32 Drobac,  supra note 1, at 14. 
33 Lourdes M. Rosado, Note, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status Should 
Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 765 
(1996).  
34 Annitto, supra note 3, at 11. 
35 Rosado, supra note 33, at 765.  
36 Id.  
37 In re J.M., 619 A. 2d 497, 499 (D.C.App. 1992).  
38 Id. at 498.  
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and found that there was a bag containing crack cocaine taped to the juvenile’s body.39 The court 
understood that his age, lack of education, inexperience and level of maturity is significant to 
determining if the juvenile’s consent was voluntary.40 The court remanded the case specifically 
so that the trial court can deal “expressly and thoroughly with the significance of age before 
finding that a juvenile consented to a search.” 41  
 Delaware is another state that considers age in determining whether consent was given 
freely. 42 State in the Interest of Trader is another example of this.43 Here, the officer was on 
routine patrol at about 2:00am and noticed a car that was weaving and crossing the “fog line.”44 
The officer believed that the operator of the vehicle was intoxicated and pulled him over. Officer 
was asking the juvenile questions including if there was contraband in the car. The juvenile 
responded that the officer may search the car if he wanted to. Before he searched the car, the 
officer conducted a pat down of the juvenile and found a small tin can with a small amount of 
marijuana. The court here noted that age, education, and intelligence can all be factors that the 
court may consider.45 In fact the court noted and took into consideration that in this case the 
juvenile was 16 years of age at the time of the incident.46 
 In Indiana, although age is not a decisive factor it is part of the considerations in the 
totality of the circumstances.47 Holman v. State, involved a seventeen year old girl who lived 
                                                                 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 503 
41 Id. at 504 
42 State in the Interest of Trader, 1993 WL 265173, *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. March 29, 1993). 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at *4. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at *3.  
47 Holman v. State, 816 N.E. 2d 78, 82 (In. Ct. App. 2004) 
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with her parents. One night while she was not home she allowed her boyfriend to enter her 
bedroom through her window to get some of his clothes. Her boyfriend was later charged with 
burglary. This case is important because the court discusses when a minor has the authority to 
consent to a search.48 The court states: “whether a minor possesses the authority to consent to a 
search depends on a number of factors, including age, intelligence and maturity of the minor.49 
Here, the court acknowledges that age and maturity level are factors that courts should look to in 
determining whether minors can give consent.50 
 Florida is another state in which age is considered.51 The juvenile was charged and 
adjudicated for possession of cannabis. The juvenile was removed from his classroom by a 
deputy sheriff and his bag was searched. The student claims that the consent was not voluntary 
that he felt pressured and coerced. The court in this case analyzed a totality of the circumstances 
to see whether or not the consent was voluntary.52 The court took into account the age of the 
juvenile but did not apply it as the juvenile did not raise age as factor.53 The court found the 
consent to be voluntary.54 This is a situation where age has to be raised by the juvenile in order to 
be considered. In situations like this, the age should always be considered by the court whether 
or not the juvenile raised it in order to be fair to every juvenile in court.  
 Colorado is an interesting state because it goes beyond just using age a factor. Colorado 
actually has a statutory exception for minors when it comes to consent to searches.55 The statute 
                                                                 
48 Id. at 82. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 IRC v. State, 968 So. 2d 583 (Fl. App.2007).  
52 Id. at 585. 
53 Id. at 587. 
54 Id.  
55 People in Interest of S.J.F, 736 P.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. Col. 1987).  
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reads: “A search by consent requires that consent to the search be obtained from the minor’s 
parents, guardian, or legal custodian.56 Colorado recognizes the protections offered to children in 
interrogation setting when Fifth Amendment rights are implicated and wants to offer the 
juveniles comparable protection when waiving Fourth Amendment rights.57 Colorado’s intent of 
this law “is to protect, restore, and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile 
justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law.”58 The legislative 
declaration future states “while holding paramount the public safety, the juvenile justice system 
shall take into consideration the best interest of the juvenile, the victim, and the community in 
providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of recidivism in the juvenile justice system and 
to assist the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society.”59 Colorado recognizes that 
juveniles do not have the mental capacity and experience to intelligently and freely give their 
consent. Colorado understands that the “best interests” of the juveniles is to have a parents or 
guardian make the decision for them.60 The best interest of the juvenile includes being entitled to 
comparable protection in connection with the waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.61 
 Other states such as Wisconsin, Oregon, and Nebraska have considered age as a factor 
when determining whether a juvenile’s consent was voluntary.62 Generally, they all understand 
that a child is more vulnerable to being coerced into giving consent. These courts understand that 
                                                                 
56 Id. at 31.  
57 Id.  
58 C.R.S.A. §19-2-102 (1999).  
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 People v. Reyes, 778 P.2d 1384, 1396 (Colo. 1971). 
62 State v. Tomlinson, 247 Wis. 2d 682 (2001); State v. Will, 131 Or. App. 498 (1994); State ex 
rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Fikes, 116 Or. App. 618 (1992); State v. Butzke, 7 
Neb. App. 360 (1998).  
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a child may be more easily frightened by an encounter with a police officer and may not have the 
maturity level to understand what it means to give up their rights.63 
 In contrast, there are states that do not see a difference between juveniles and adults and 
therefore treat them exactly the same when deciding whether consent was voluntary. Utah is one 
of those states.64 In State ex rel. R.A., a juvenile became ill after ingesting mushrooms and 
marijuana.65 The officers wanted to find out who supplied him with the drugs. They searched 
through his phone and found the information of R.A., another juvenile. The officer called R.A. 
and found out that he was working; the officer advised R.A. if he returned home and gave the 
officer the drugs, R.A. would not be taken to detention, R.A. agreed to come home and give the 
officer the drugs.66 Officer than asked R.A. if he can search the car and R.A. agreed, but the 
search of the car did not produce anything. Then officer followed R.A. into his bedroom where 
R.A. gave the items to the officer. R.A. claims that the consent to search was a product of 
coercion.67 In the analysis of this court, they cited several factors that did not include of the age 
of the suspect.68 The court found that the consent was not a product of coercion or duress; 
however they did not take into account R.A.’s age in reaching that conclusion.69 
 Georgia is another state that treats juveniles as equivalent to adults.70 In re S.B. involves 
officers on patrol who are following a car for some time stopping as the car stops and continue to 
                                                                 
63 State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Fikes, 116 Or. App. 618, 624 (1992) 
64 State ex rel. R.A., 231 P. 3d 808 (Ut. App. 2010). 
65 Id. at 811. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 812. 
69 Id. at 813.  
70 In re S.B., 427 S.E. 2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); In re A.T., 691 S.E. 2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2010). 
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follow the car when it starts moving again. The teen eventually stops the car and approaches the 
officer with an I.D. The officers ask to search his vehicle and the teen verbally consented. The 
search of the car revealed a pistol. In deeming the search valid the court found that the teen 
voluntarily consented. The Georgia court used a totality of the circumstances test yet did not 
consider or address the teenager’s age at all treating him as they would a fully mature adult.71 
 Another state that does not consider age is California.72 Jessica was a young female about 
16 years of age out late at night at a gas station. An officer went up to her and noticed she had a 
puffy jacket on. The officer asked her if she had anything illegal on her to which she replied “not 
that I know of.” The officer proceeded to search her person and found methamphetamine in her 
jacket pocket. The California court found that she had voluntary consent to search of her person. 
Like Georgia, the court looked at the totality of the circumstances but did not discuss or address 
her age in their analysis.73 
 In another California case, police officers were on patrol when they received a radio 
dispatch that a citizen reported drug activity in the area.74 As they approached the scene, the 
officers saw a juvenile leaning into a car. The juvenile then began to walk away. As the juvenile 
noticed the officers following him, the juvenile dropped a brown paper bag which later searched 
revealed marijuana.75 The court did not consider age at all in their inquiry. The court asked 
themselves “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
                                                                 
71 In re S.B., 429 S.E. 2d at 54.  
72 In re Jessica M., No. A11311, 2007 WL 593609 at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2007).  
73 Id. at *5.  
74 In re Kemonte H., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1507 (1990). 
75 Id. at 1512.  
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have believed he was not free to leave.” The accused here was 13 year old, just barely a teen and 
subject to the same standard an adult would be subject to.76 
 In summary, case law shows that some courts view age as a considering factor into 
whether a juvenile voluntarily consents, while other courts completely ignore age and treat a 
fourteen year old the same as they would treat a forty year old. The inconsistency in how the 
courts have handled the issue of the consent searches of minors leaves unanswered many 
questions about what law courts should apply and how police officers should act when trying to 
conduct a search. Since minors are different and need to be treated differently they need to be 
provided the same protection whether they are from Washington D.C. or California.  
III. JUVENILES HAVE PRIVACY INTERESTS  
 The fourth amendment balances two interests. One is public safety while the other is 
protecting the privacy of an individual.77 Although at first glance, it may seem that juveniles 
have no privacy interests because of the many rules a juvenile has to follow in daily life. 
However, Courts have recognized that juveniles do have privacy interests.78 In Carey v. 
Population Services International, there was a law, particularly Section 6811(8) of the New 
York Education law that makes it a crime for any person to distribute contraceptives to a minor 
under 16.79 The Court held that the state interest was not compelling enough to prevent minors to 
obtaining contraceptives. The Court found that juveniles do have privacy interests.80  
                                                                 
76 Id. at 1512.  
77 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.  
78 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  
79 Id. at 678.  
80 Id. at 682.  
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 Arizona courts have held that a juvenile does have a privacy interest in his/her integrity 
and identity.81 In Mario W. v. Kaipio, the state is allowed to obtain buccal cells of the juveniles 
that have been charged with certain offenses.82 However, the state cannot go so far as to extract 
the DNA information contained in the sample. It is a great intrusion because the sample needs to 
be processed and so much of the person’s identification is contained in that sample. It violates 
the fourth amendment and is a great intrusion of privacy.83 This case reveals that juveniles are 
afforded privacy protections recognized in the law.  
 Oregon is another state that recognizes a juvenile’s privacy even in schools.84 In State ex 
rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Clackamas County v. M.A.D., the youth was suspected of having marijuana 
in school.85 The youth was called to office and asked if he had anything on him. The school 
official saw a bulge in his breast pocket of his jacket and went into the pocket and took out 
marijuana. The court noted that that youth had a privacy interest in his jacket pocket even though 
he was on school grounds. The court states: “there is no suggestion that juveniles are any less 
secure in their right of privacy against government intrusions than adults.”86 
 The above case law reveals that juveniles do have privacy interests that need to be taken 
into account even at school where their privacy tends to be less recognized. Therefore juveniles 
do have a privacy interest of their persons or their belongings and so juveniles needed to be 
                                                                 
81 Mario W. v. Kaipio, 230 Ariz. 122, 127 (2012). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 128.  
84 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Clackamas County v. M.A.D., 226 Or. App. 21 (2009).  
85 Id. at 23. 
86 Id. at 32.  
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afforded the protections so that their will is not overborne. For this reason, courts should extend 
privacy protections to juveniles’ fourth amendment rights.  
 
IV. JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT THAN ADULTS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE 
TREATED DIFFERENTLY AND AFFORDED MORE PROTECTIONS THAN ADULTS 
There has always been a fascination with the developing brains of teens. This has been 
shown in all aspects of life. Car insurances claiming that teens’ brains are not fully developed, 
that they are risky and should only be able to attain driving privileges gradually.87 Juveniles have 
limited rights in choosing to have an abortion, have sex, or get married.88 Juveniles cannot 
vote.89 Juveniles cannot consent to medical procedures.90 There are many things that juveniles 
are prohibited from doing even if they want to consent. This all has to do with their competence 
and their capacity to understand what they are doing and the consequences of their actions.91 
There are many changes going on throughout a young person’s body and this includes significant 
changes in their brains. These changes impact the ability to reason and understand.92 
The frontal cortex is still developing and it is associated with “response inhibition, 
emotional regulation, planning, organization, impulse control, and making informed judgments.93 
This less-developed frontal cortex is the reason why young people take risks and don’t consider 
                                                                 
87 Terry A. Maroney, Article, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009).  
88 Memphis Planned Parentshood v. Sunquist, 184 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1999). 
89 Drobac, supra note 1, at 2.   
90 Id.   
91 Id. at 5.  
92 Id. at 14 
93 Id.  
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consequences of their actions.94 The cerebellum is also developing in these years and its 
functions control “all forms of higher thought” including social skills and ability to make 
decisions.95 Neuroscience suggests that young people’s brains are developing past the age of 
consent. Neuroscience suggests that juveniles do not have full legal capacity and that they should 
not be able to consent until at least after 18.96  
Cognitive abilities also continue to grow and mature into early adulthood. This is 
responsible for the child’s thinking skills and advanced reasoning.97 Adolescents also want to 
break free from their families and hang out more with their friends developing social skills and 
feeling a sense of independence. However, because of their developing brain, teens tend to focus 
on short-term results and get pressured easier. “Adolescent responsibility, temperance, and 
perspective distinguish teen from adult judgment.”98  
This scientific research shows that juveniles’ brains are still developing and do not have 
full brain capacity as an adult would.99 Scholars and advocates having started to bring these ideas 
to courts and while it seems to have an impact in regards to custodial interrogations it has not 
made its way to consent for searches. The scientific research still has a limited impact on most 
courts in deciding whether consent by a juvenile was voluntary and treat the juvenile as they 
would an adult.100  
                                                                 
94 Maroney, supra note 86, at 106.  
95 Id. at 99.  
96 See “Developing Capacity: Adolescent “consent” at work, at law and in the sciences of the 
mind, 10 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 1.   
97 Maroney, supra note 86, at 99.  
98 Drobac, supra note 1, at 58.   
99 Id. at 14. 
100 Maroney, supra note 86, at 91.    
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This research tells us that juveniles are different than adults. Juveniles are still trying to 
understand things in life and that they are more vulnerab le to coercion and submit more readily 
to authorities.101 They usually do not have a full understanding of their rights and do not 
understand what it means when they waive them. In most situations when they are confronted by 
authorities they become frightened and may believe that consenting to a search will help them 
when it will only make matters worse for them.  
V. JUVENILES TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL AREAS  
 Since the way courts deal with juveniles and consent in the Fourth Amendment is very 
inconsistent, it is helpful to turn to how age has been dealt with in other constitutional areas 
particularly the 14th, 5th and 8th amendments. In their reasoning and analysis a path to a more 
uniform consistent standard can be found for juveniles and consent searches.  
A. 14th Amendment  
As early at 1948, the Court recognized that juveniles are different.102 The Court used the 
14th amendment to say that coerced confessions from juveniles are not admissible.103 Section 1 of 
the 14th amendment provides that: “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law…”104 A person is given an empty form of due process of 
law when he confesses without a full appreciation of his constitutional rights.105 An adolescent, 
because of his developing brain and vulnerability, does not have a full appreciation of his 
                                                                 
101 Drobac, supra note 1, at 31.  
102 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 597 (1948).  
103 Id. at 601. 
104 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
105 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 597, 600 (1948).  
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constitutional rights.106 Therefore, a juvenile needs the aid of counsel or a parent to make an 
informed decision before confessing to a crime.107 
The Supreme Court, in Haley v. Ohio, understood that a child at the age of 14 is 
easily overcome by confrontations with law enforcement.108 This was a case involving a 14 year 
old boy serving as a look out in an armed robbery. The store owner was shot and later died, the 
boy was charged and convicted of 1st degree murder. During the interrogation the boy was 
questioned for five hours straight.109 His mother and attorney were denied entry to see him or 
speak to him. However, the police did allow a photographer from a newspaper gain entry to 
photograph him. The Court cited his age here as a critical factor in whether his confession at the 
time of interrogation was admissible or not.110 The Court found that everything combined; his 
not being able to speak with his mother or attorney and especially his age rendered his 
confession inadmissible. The Court went on with much emphasis to show that juveniles were 
different.111 The court mentioned how the teenage years are ones of great instability. A child of 
adolescent years may not feel as if he had a choice. A child of adolescent years do not have a full 
appreciation of warning read to him and what are the consequences of waiving them. The court 
recognized a need for adult protection.112 
 
                                                                 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 607.  
108 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 597 (1948).  
109 Id. at 598.  
110 Id. at 599.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 601.  
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 In 1962, the Court again stated how age is a critical factor when determining whether a 
confession from a 14 year old boy was voluntary.113  In Gallegos v. Colorado, a 14 year old boy 
was accused of assaulting a man and stealing $13 from him.114 The boy admitted to the robbery 
but the man later died and he was charged and convicted of 1st degree murder.115 The crucial 
evidence against him was a formal written confession signed by the juvenile. The juvenile signed 
this after being held in detention for five days without being able to see a lawyer, parent, or other 
adult.116 The Court eloquently states: “He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of 
his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of 
knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his right and without 
the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take.”117 The Court understood that his 
age and fear in the situation he found himself caused his will to be overborne by the authorities.  
B. 5th Amendment  
The Fifth Amendment provides protections against self-incrimination.118 One of the ways 
the 5th amendment provides protection is to hold inadmissible a coerced confession during 
custodial interrogation. This 5th amendment protection has been extended and expanded for 
juveniles. Courts have recognized that juveniles are different than adults and need to be treated 
differently.119 Age becomes a critical factor in determining whether a confession is coerced.120 
 
                                                                 
113 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 50.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 54.  
118 U.S. Const. amend. V.  
119 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).  
120 Id.  
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In custodial interrogations, age of the person interrogated is taking into consideration.121  
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, involved a 13 year old charged with breaking and entering.122 He was 
stopped and questioned at the site of the break in. Five days later, when they found a camera at 
his school matching of the proceeds of the breaking and entering, he was taken out of school and 
questioned.123 He provided a statement without being given Miranda warnings and without being 
able to contact any adult.124 The Court states that the child’s age was a crucial factor in this case 
and the child needs to be treated differently than an adult would but he is in fact different than an 
adult. The Court mentions: “the risk of compelling pressures is higher when the suspect is a 
juvenile…children cannot be viewed as mini adults, age has to be considered because children 
are less likely to feel that they are free to leave in situations like the one J.D.B. was put in.125 In 
fact, they understand that age “generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and 
perception, children are generally less mature and responsible than adults.”126 
 Justice Marshall’s dissent in Fare v. Michael C. shows that juveniles have been 
recognized in case law to be different than adults and need to be protected.127 Juveniles, more 
often than adults, are scared when they are confronted with a situation they do not fully 
understand.128 Juveniles want to confide in someone they trust. In Michael C.’s case that person 
he wanted to confide in was his probation officer.129 Marshall states that a juvenile should be 
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able to speak with an adult they trust and even if it is a probation officer that does not mean that 
they waive their 5th amendment rights. In fact it should be an assertion of them.130 
 
 These cases suggest how juveniles are more prone to be coerced into giving statements 
even if they are not true in order for the police to let them go. When the courts do not allow a 
child to speak with an adult they trust, the child becomes even more frightened and just wants to 
go home. Juveniles are more prone to submission to authorities than adults are. They may be 
scared into giving a confession which should not be given without advice from a trusted adult.  
This is why juveniles need to be given these extra protections in all areas of law especially the 
area of consent.  
 
C. 8th Amendment  
 
Juveniles have been treated differently when it comes to the punishment of their 
crimes.131 The 8th amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments and excessive fines and 
bails.132 The Supreme Court has found that the 8th amendment prohibits a death penalty sentence 
for those engaged in crime as juveniles.133 The Supreme Court has also found that a life sentence 
without parole for those who committed crimes before the age of 18 could be a violation of the 
8th amendment.134 The Court understood that juveniles do not understand the consequences of 
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their actions like adults do.135 The Court further notes that juveniles have a better ability to be 
rehabilitated and become a productive member of society than adults do.136  
 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is prohibited for 
those who committed crimes when they were under 18 years old.137 Christopher Simmons 
committed murder when he was 17 and was sentenced to death. The rationale behind this holding 
is because of the fact that juveniles are different than adults.138 The Court mentions how 
juveniles are immature and irresponsible and “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.”139 The court realized that juveniles still struggle to find their 
identity and are easily pressured.140 
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court also held that the 8th amendment prohibits imposing a 
sentence of life without parole for juveniles who did not commit homicide.141 Terrance Jamar 
Graham was 16 when he committed the crime of burglary. He was sentenced to probation. 
However, he violated probation and was then sentenced to life in prison for the original charge of 
burglary. The Court accepted the finding in Roper that juveniles are different than adults and 
adds that there is more of a chance that a juvenile’s failings can be rehabilitated as compared to 
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adults. The Court held that life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile 
who has not committed murder.142 
 
In 2012, the Supreme Court took it a step further and held that mandatory life in prison 
without parole for those who committed crimes under the age of 18 violated the 8th 
amendment.143 Evan Miller was 14 years old when he committed the crime of murder and he was 
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.144 The Court took the understanding 
that juveniles were different from Roper and the idea from Graham v. Florida that life without 
parole sentences for juveniles equated to the death penalty.145 The Court found that courts need 
to be able to consider any mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty even if the 
juvenile committed a murder.146 Here, the juvenile was 14 years old, he was high on drugs when 
he committed the crime and he was neglected as child with parents who were addicted to 
drugs.147All those facts were considered by the Court here. The Court realized that juveniles are 
different and different circumstances may lead a juvenile to commit even a murder; however 
certain factors need to be taken into account, especially their age and the possibility of 
rehabilitation.148 Here, the Court believed those were strong factors in reversing Miller’s life 
without parole sentence.149 
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 These cases reveal that in other constitutional areas juveniles have been viewed and 
treated differently than adults. This is because courts have accepted the research and recognized 
that juvenile’s mental capacity is not fully functioning as compared to an adult. The courts also 
recognized juveniles are vulnerable, more susceptible to pressure, and easier to coerce than 
adults. These are many of the same reasons why juveniles need to be treated differently when it 
comes to consent. In every case age must be a consideration.  
 
VI. JUVENILES AND CAPACITY TO CONSENT IN OTHER AREAS OF LAW  
 
 Juveniles have limited capacity to consent to many critical decisions of life such as 
marriage, abortion, contracts, and sex.150 Consent to search should be included in that list 
because juveniles do not understand the implications of consenting just as it is found that they do 
not understand the implications of consenting to marriage, or contracts, or sex.  
 
A. Marriage  
 
Marriage is a major life decision that can have potentially serious consequences.151 
Minors under the under of 18 cannot enter into marriage in many states such as New York.152 
Moe v. Dinkins involved New York Domestic Relations Law Section 15.2 which provides that a 
juvenile seeking to get married needs parental consent.153 The reason for this rule is that the state 
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wants to protect minors from “immature decision-making and preventing unstable marriages.”154 
Here the state realizes minors are immature and are unable to make critical life decisions in an 
informed and mature manner. The state goes further to say “minors often lack experience, 
perspective, and judgment necessarily to make important, affirmative choices with potentially 
serious consequences.”155 The court agreed with the state and held that parental consent is 
rationally related to the legitimate interests of the state.156 
 
 Much like the rationale behind why juveniles cannot consent to marriage, juveniles 
should not be able to consent to a search. Consenting to a search is a critical decision that can 
have potentially serious consequences. Consenting to a search is a serious decision that a 
juvenile should make after consulting with their parents or counsel. Like marriage, juveniles lack 
the experience and judgment in making an informed decision to consent to search.  
 
B. Abortion  
 
Thirty-eight states require parental involvement in a minor’s decisions to have an 
abortion.157 Of those thirty-eight states, twenty-one states require parental consent only.158 
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Twelve of those states require parental notification only.159  Finally, five of those states require 
both parental consent and notification.160 Although abortion is considered a privacy interest 
because the consequences of abortion can be a lot more severe than making the decision to take 
birth control it is important that juveniles get the protection they need.161 Memphis, Tennessee is 
one of the states that do not allow a physician to perform an abortion without parental consent. In 
Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sunquist, Planned Parenthood sued to prevent the state from 
enforcing its Parental Consent for Abortion by Minors Act.162  The court believed that the 
reasoning for the Parent Consent for Abortion by Minor Act was justified and deemed it valid.  
The reasoning was the children have a peculiar vulnerability; they have an inability to make an 
informed, mature decision.163 The reasoning affords the child the opportunity not to make a 
decision without at least confiding in an adult. Most children who end up pregnant become 
nervous that their parents will disown them, but having this law makes it possible to let the child 
see that they are not alone in making a decision that they can do it with a more mature informed 
adult.  
 
C. CONTRACTS 
 
Contract made by minors are voidable.164 This is in order to protect minors from fraud 
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and imposition practiced on them. This law is made because it realizes that minors are more 
susceptible to coercion and can be duped into making contracts in which they do not realize the 
consequences.165 
  
 In Parkwood OB/GYN Inc. v. Hess, a doctor sued for unpaid medical services.166 
Defendant was a minor when the doctor performed medical services on her. In this case, doctor 
was aware of minor’s birthdate and knew of her minority status and her incapacity to contract.167 
The court found that the contract was void and not enforceable against the minor because of the 
knowledge of the doctor that the minor was under the age to contract for medical services.168 
 Juveniles enter into contracts because they were forced to, or because they wanted 
something and thought it was a good deal. Children believe that they are capable of making 
decisions for themselves.169 In the teenage years they want to achieve autonomy and may make 
decisions they think are correct.170 The research shows that they are not correct, they do not 
understand what predicaments they may put themselves into and may make a situation worse for 
themselves. This is the reason why the law provides for contracts to be made voidable. Juveniles 
are taking advantages of by many. In the issue of consent they are also taking advantage of by 
police officers and that is why they need the protections and should not be able to consent.  
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D. SEX  
 
Minors cannot consent to sex and most states have varying statutory rape laws which  
prohibit minors from having sex.171  For example in New Jersey, minors under the age of 12 are 
prohibited from having sex at all. Minors between the ages of 13 and 16 are prohibited from 
having sexual partners that are more than 4 years older than them.  The reasons for this are the 
same reasons why minors cannot consent to marriages or contract or abortions. Sex is a decision 
that can have severe consequences on minors.172 They do not have the capacity to make informed 
mature decisions. Minors are unequal to adults socially and financially and may not be able to 
deal with the consequences of sex that adults can.173 Statutory rape laws are meant to protect 
minors because of their immaturity.174 
 
 In all these cases, juveniles are unable to consent to these crucial life decisions for all the 
same reasons. They are immature, they lack the capacity and experience to make informed 
decisions that can impact their life. Since they lack the capacity to do all these things, it seems 
logical to conclude that they lack the capacity to understand something as complicated as a 
waiver of fourth amendment rights. This is something that can lead to potentially more severe 
consequences on a juvenile than sex or consenting to a contract. It can take away their liberty, it 
can affect their ability to obtain a job in the future, and it can affect so many things for a majority 
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of their life. Therefore, just as juveniles cannot consent to marriage, contracts, sex, or abortion 
they should not be able to consent to searches.  
 
VII. PROPOSED STANDARD: JUVENILES SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONSENT TO 
SEARCHES  
 
 When it comes to a minor’s consent of searches courts are inconsistent. Some courts 
simply ignore age and treat juveniles the same as adults while other courts consider age to be an 
important factor.175 Age should be given consideration is all cases. All courts should accept and 
recognize the research associated with juveniles. Juveniles are different. Juveniles cannot be 
treated equally as adults.176 They lack the capacity of understand and the life experience that 
adults have. Consent laws regarding juveniles should be equivalent to the consent laws in place 
now regarding sex, marriage, abortion, and contracts. They should not be able to consent to 
searches for the exact same reasons that they cannot consent to getting married.177 The enormous 
difference in power between a developing teenager and a police officer will affect the decisions 
of the youth.178 This suggest that consent by juveniles can never be voluntary. Unlike custodial 
interrogations where juveniles are exposed to Miranda warnings, searches do not involve being 
informed of consequences of consenting. Juveniles need protection from the consequences of 
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consenting to a search for the same reason they need protection from the consequences of sex or 
agreeing to a contract. They just do not have the capacity to make an informed decision.179 
 
In the alternative, because of the interest of keeping a community safe and because 
sometimes the only way a police officer can obtain access to dangerous weapons or drugs, a 
child may consent. However, they need to be afforded higher protections that are applied 
uniformly to all minors. These higher protections can include the requirement that an officer 
needs to advise the juvenile of the right to refuse, the requirement of having a parent or other 
trusted adult there to advise the juvenile and if not available then consent still cannot be granted 
by the juveniles because the protections of the juvenile come first before any other interest. 
Protections of the juveniles come first because they come first in so many different areas of law 
including the ones mentioned above such as marriage, sex, consent, abortion. The community 
wants children to be safe and protected from harm, distress, and coercion that doing any of these 
things including consenting to a search, can cause.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION  
 
 Courts need to be consistent in how they treat juveniles with regard to consenting to 
searches. On one hand court do not think that age is relevant at all and simply apply an adult 
standard to a juvenile. On the other hand courts consider age and realize that juveniles need to be 
offered more protection. Case law in many areas of law show that juveniles are different. Minors 
lack the capacity to make an informed decision that can affect their lives. They do not have the 
life experience or maturity of an adult to understand the decisions. This is reflected in laws that 
do not allow a child to marry, vote, have sex, enter contracts and so forth. In that same regard, 
juveniles should not be allowed to consent to searches. The things a search can reveal not only 
affect the privacy interests of juveniles but also may affect their liberty and there future lives.    
  
 
  
